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Abstract
The classical view of epistemic logic is that an agent knows all the logical consequences of their
knowledge base. This assumption of logical omniscience is often unrealistic and makes reasoning
computationally intractable. One approach to avoid logical omniscience is to limit reasoning to a certain
belief level, which intuitively measures the reasoning “depth.”
This paper investigates the computational complexity of reasoning with belief levels. First we show
that while reasoning remains tractable if the level is constant, the complexity jumps to PSPACE-
complete – that is, beyond classical reasoning – when the belief level is part of the input. Then we
further refine the picture using parameterized complexity theory to investigate how the belief level and
the number of non-logical symbols affect the complexity.
1 Introduction
The standard way of modeling knowledge and belief1 in epistemic logic is in terms of possible worlds: an
agent knows a proposition if and only if it is true in all worlds the agent considers possible. A side-effect
of this model is that agents are assumed to be logically omniscient, that is, they know all the consequences
of what they know [Hintikka, 1975].
Unfortunately, the assumption of logical omniscience is inappropriate for most resource-bounded
agents like humans or robots: it drives up the computational cost of reasoning and is usually far beyond the
their capabilities. Theories of limited belief therefore aim to lift the omniscience assumption.
A number of theories of limited belief have been proposed, predominantly in the 1980s and 1990s
[Konolige, 1986; Kaplan and Schubert, 2000; Vardi, 1986; Fagin and Halpern, 1987; Levesque, 1984;
Patel-Schneider, 1990; Lakemeyer, 1994; Delgrande, 1995]. A common problem with these approaches is,
however, that either their model of limiting belief is too fine-grained or it misses out on simple inferences.
A novel approach to limited belief developed over a series of papers [Liu et al., 2004; Lakemeyer and
Levesque, 2013; Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2014; Klassen et al., 2015; Schwering and Lakemeyer, 2016;
1We use the terms knowledge and belief interchangeably.
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Table 1: The classification of Limited Belief Reasoning depending on whether the belief level k, number
of function terms |F|, and the number of standard names |N | are constant, parameters, or input.
|F| k |N |
Input
Input — PSPACE-c Theorem 9
Param
Input AW[P]-c Theorem 11
Param
W[P]-c Proposition 12Const
Param
Input Input co-W[P]-c Theorem 13Param
— Param FPT Proposition 14Const
— Const —
PTIME Corollary 8Const — —
Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2016; Schwering, 2017] attempts to address this issue. The basic idea is to
stratify beliefs into belief levels, where the first one, level 0, only comprises the explicit beliefs, that is,
what is written down expressly in the knowledge base, and higher belief levels k + 1 draw additional
conclusions based on what is believed at level k. Semantically the logic can be characterized using sets of
clauses instead of possible worlds, and through case splits, that is, by branching on all the values some
term can take and propagating the value.
As an example, consider the following knowledge base:
fatherOf(Sally) = Frank ∨ fatherOf(Sally) = Fred
fatherOf(Sally) = n ⊃ rich(n) => for n ∈ {Frank,Fred}.
Here, Sally, Frank, Fred, > name distinct individuals (> is an auxiliary name for modeling propositions),
whereas fatherOf and rich represent functions in the classical sense. From this knowledge we can deduce
rich(Frank) => ∨ rich(Fred) => at level 1 by splitting on all potential fathers of Sally: if Frank is the
father, then Frank is rich; if Fred is the father, then he is rich; every other potential father contradicts the
first clause.
Logics of limited belief in general and the belief level mechanism in particular aim to provide means
of controlling the reasoning effort in a comprehensible and explainable way, as contrasted with using a
classical reasoner and terminating it after a timeout, for example. The rationale behind the belief level
approach is that reasoning at small belief levels should be relatively cheap but still sufficient for the average
problem a human or a robot faces during their daily operation. Experiments confirm this hypothesis for the
confined domains of Sudoku and Minesweeper [Schwering, 2017].
Contribution
In this paper, we analyze reasoning with belief levels from the perspective of complexity theory. More
precisely, we study the problem of deciding whether a knowledge base entails a query at a certain belief
level. For a constant belief level, the problem is indeed in PTIME and hence known to be tractable; the
same holds when the knowledge base and query mention only a constant number of function terms.
However, we shall see that if both the belief level and the number of function terms are part of the
problem input, then the complexity jumps to PSPACE-complete! This may come as a surprise given
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W[1] A[1]
W[2] A[2]
W[SAT] AW[SAT]
W[P] AW[P]
=
PTIME
PSPACE
NP
. . . . . .
Figure 1: Overview of the classical and parameterized complexity classes relevant for this paper. The
classes from the W-hierarchy include parameterized versions of different natural NP-complete problems;
the A-hierarchy can be seen as parameterized version of the polynomial hierarchy. C1 C2 means
C1 ⊆ C2, and C1 C2 means that C2 can be seen as a parameterized analogue of C1.
that classical, unlimited reasoning is in co-NP. So (large) belief levels appear to make reasoning harder.
Intuitively, the jump is caused by the belief level limiting a possibly scarce resource, namely the number of
case splits, which needs to be utilized in an optimal way.
The gap between PTIME and PSPACE-completeness calls for a more refined analysis, which we carry
out using parameterized complexity theory. We investigate three dimensions of parameters: (1) the belief
level, (2) the number of function terms mentioned in the reasoning problem (in the above example, the
function terms are fatherOf(Sally), rich(Frank), rich(Fred)), and (3) the number of mentioned so-called
standard names (in the example, these names are Sally, Frank, Fred, >). Parameterized complexity theory
offers the W- and A-hierarchies to classify problems between PTIME and NP and between NP and PSPACE,
respectively. We locate the parameterized variants of our problem within these hierarchies.
A comprehensive overview of the paper’s findings is given in Table 1. Figure 1 illustrates the relation-
ships between the complexity classes we deal with in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the logic of limited belief and defines
the reasoning problem that we shall study. Section 3 introduces a gadget that we use in several reductions.
Section 4 begins the complexity analysis from the perspective of classical complexity theory with PTIME
and PSPACE results. Section 5 refines the picture using parameterized complexity theory. Then we
conclude.
This paper is an extended version of [Chen et al., 2018].
2 The Logic of Limited Belief
In its most recent form, the logic of limited belief is a first-order logic with functions, equality, and
epistemic modal operators [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2016; Schwering, 2017]. In this paper, we limit our
consideration to the quantifier-free case.
This section first introduces the syntax and semantics of this logic, and then defines the reasoning
problem whose complexity we will study in the remainder of the paper: if we know KB explicitly, do
we believe α at level k? The definitions and results of this section are adopted from [Schwering, 2017]
with some minor simplifications to ease the technical treatment; these simplifications do not affect the
expressivity or complexity of the reasoning task at hand.
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2.1 The Language
A term is either a standard name (or name for short) or a function term f(n1, . . . , nj), where f is a
function symbol and every ni is a standard name. Standard names can be understood as special constants
that satisfy the unique-names assumption and an infinitary version of domain closure. We assume an
infinite supply of standard names as well as of function symbols.
A literal is an expression of the form t= n or ¬t= n, where t is a function term and n is a standard
name. A formula is a literal or an expression of the form ¬α, (α ∨ β), or Bkα, where α, β are formulas
and k ≥ 0 is a natural number. We read Bkα as “α is known at belief level k;” in case k = 0 we also say
“α is known explicitly.” We use the usual abbreviations t 6= n, (α ∧ β), (α ⊃ β), and may omit brackets to
ease readability.
A formula without Bk is called objective. Schwering [2017] has shown that there is a linear Turing
reduction from the reasoning problem with nested beliefs to the non-nested case. Hence to simplify the
presentation we henceforth assume that α in Bkα is objective. As usual, a conjunction of disjunctions of
literals is said to be in conjunctive normal form (CNF).
2.2 The Semantics
The semantics of limited belief is based on clause subsumption, unit propagation, and case splits. A clause
is a set of literals. We abuse notation and identify a non-empty clause {`1, . . . , `j} with the formula
(`1∨ . . .∨ `j). In the rest of this paragraph, we implicitly assume that n, n′ refer to distinct standard names.
A clause c1 subsumes another clause c2 iff for every t = n ∈ c1, either t = n ∈ c2 or t 6= n′ ∈ c2, and
for every t 6= n ∈ c1, also t 6= n ∈ c2. We say two literals `1, `2 are complementary when they are of the
form t= n and t 6= n or of the form t= n and t= n′. The unit propagation of a clause c and a literal ` is
obtained by removing from c all literals complementary to `. For a set of clauses s, we let UP(s) be the
closure of s under unit propagation and subsumption.
The truth relation |≈ is defined between a formula α and a set of clauses s. Intuitively, s acts as a
partial model. At belief level 0, α is broken down to clause level and then checked for subsumption by
UP(s). Higher belief levels allow to branch on a function term t and all its values n and add t= n to s,
which may then trigger unit propagation in UP(s) and thus produce new inferences. The formal definition
is as follows:
1. if c is a clause: s |≈ c iff c ∈ UP(s)
2. if (α ∨ β) is not a clause: s |≈ (α ∨ β) iff s |≈ α or s |≈ β
3. s |≈ ¬(α ∨ β) iff s |≈ ¬α and s |≈ ¬β
4. s |≈ ¬¬α iff s |≈ α
5. s |≈ B0α iff s |≈ α
6. s |≈ Bk+1α iff for some function term t, for all names n,
s ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bkα
7. s |≈ ¬Bkα iff s 6|≈ Bkα
In the remainder, we refer to these definitions as Rules 1–7. As usual, a formula α is valid, written |≈ α,
iff s |≈ α for every set of clauses s.
The belief level k in Bkα specifies the number of case splits, which corresponds to the maximum
permitted reasoning effort for proving α. Limited belief is monotonic in the belief level:
Lemma 1 |≈ Bkα ⊃ Bk+1α.
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Moreover, belief stabilizes at a high-enough belief level in the following sense:
Lemma 2 Let F contain all function terms in s and α, and let k ≥ |F|. Then s |≈ Bkα iff s |≈ B|F|α.
Example
Let us revisit the example from the introduction to illustrate how the semantics works. Let s contain the
clauses
fatherOf(Sally) = Frank ∨ fatherOf(Sally) = Fred
fatherOf(Sally) 6= Frank ∨ rich(Frank) =>
fatherOf(Sally) 6= Fred ∨ rich(Fred) =>
and let c denote the clause rich(Frank) => ∨ rich(Fred) =>. Then s |≈ B1c holds by splitting the cases
for Sally’s father:
• UP(s ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Frank}) 3 rich(Frank) => by unit propagation with the second clause.
• UP(s ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Fred}) 3 rich(Fred) => by unit propagation with the third clause.
• UP(s∪{fatherOf(Sally)=n}) for n /∈ {Frank,Fred} contains the empty clause by unit propagation
with the first clause.
In each case, we obtain a clause that subsumes c, so for every potential father n, c ∈ UP(s∪{fatherOf(Sally)=
n}).
Classical Semantics
For future reference, we briefly give the classical, “unlimited” semantics of objective formulas. A world w
is a function from function terms to standard names. Truth of an objective formula α in a world w, written
w |= α, is defined as follows:
• w |= t= n iff w(t) = n
• w |= ¬α iff w 6|= α
• w |= (α ∨ β) iff w |= α or w |= β
We write s |= α to say that for all w, if w |= c for all c ∈ s, then w |= α. Moreover, we write |= α for
∅ |= α.
Limited belief is sound as well as eventually complete with respect to classical semantics in the
following sense:
Proposition 3 For all finite s and all α, there is a (large-enough) belief level k ≥ 0 such that s |≈ Bkα
iff s |= α.
Proof sketch. Soundness holds because Rule 6 branches over all names. Eventual completeness holds
because k can be chosen large enough to split all terms in s, α.
2.3 The Limited Belief Reasoning Problem
The fundamental problem of reasoning about limited belief is to decide whether for a given knowledge
base KB and a query α, if KB is known explicitly, then α is known at belief level k. In limited belief, KB
is typically assumed to be CNF [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2016]. The formal definition is:
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Limited Belief Reasoning
Instance: Objective formulas KB and α over function terms F and standard names N ,
KB in CNF, belief level k ≥ 0.
Problem: Decide whether |≈ B0KB ⊃ Bkα.
We shall investigate this problem using classical complexity theory first and then refine the picture
using parameterized complexity theory for parameters k, |F|, |N |. An overview of the results is in Table 1.
Since the knowledge base in Limited Belief Reasoning is assumed to be in CNF, it corresponds to a
unique (modulo UP) set of clauses and the problem can be equivalently expressed as a model checking
problem:
Lemma 4 Let KB be in CNF with clauses s = {c1, . . . , cj}.
Then |≈ B0KB ⊃ Bkα iff s |≈ Bkα.
Thus and by Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, Limited Belief Reasoning is sound and eventually complete
with respect to classical reasoning: |≈ B0KB ⊃ B|F|α iff |= KB ⊃ α.
Finally, the following lemma says that in Rule 6 a finite number of function terms and standard names
is sufficient.
Lemma 5 Let F (resp.N ) contain all function terms (resp. standard names) in s, α, and let nˆ /∈ N be an
additional name. Then s |≈ Bk+1α iff for some t ∈ F , for all n ∈ N ∪ {nˆ}, s ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bkα.
Together, Lemmas 4 and 5 give rise to a decision procedure for Limited Belief Reasoning, which
works as follows. First, the problem is turned into the equivalent model checking problem using Lemma 4.
Then the procedure applies Lemma 5 to reduce the belief level, and finally follows Rules 1–5 to break α
down to clause level and check the clauses for subsumption. It is already known that this procedure runs in
time O(2k(|KB|+ |α|)k+3) [Schwering, 2017].
3 Ordering Gadget
It is easy to see that the ordering in which terms are split can be relevant. For example, let s contain the
following four clauses:
f = n ∨ g1 = n ∨ h= n f 6= n ∨ g2 = n ∨ h= n
f = n ∨ g1 6= n ∨ h= n f 6= n ∨ g2 6= n ∨ h= n
Then s |≈ B2h= n can be proved by splitting f first and then, depending on the value of f , splitting g1 or
g2 next, but not the other way around.
In this section we construct a gadget that generalizes this idea in order to enforce that a goal formula
can only be proved by splitting terms in a certain order (at polynomial cost in space). This gadget is used
repeatedly in the proofs of Sections 4 and 5. For example, in Theorem 9 we use it to preserve the quantifier
ordering of the quantified Boolean formula.
To begin with, the following lemma shows how to make sure that one of the terms from a set F is split
no later than at belief level k. We use the notation [k] for {1, . . . , k}.
Lemma 6 Let F be a non-empty finite set of function terms, and L be a set of literals where every term
from F occurs exactly once. Let Bkα be a formula with k ≥ 1. Let s be a set of clauses such that for all
t /∈ F , for some name n, s ∪ {t= n} 6|= ∨`∈L ` and s ∪ {t= n} 6|= ∨`∈L ¬`.
Let `wi , `
o
j for i ∈ [k − 1], j ∈ [k] be literals with distinct function terms fwi , f oj that do not occur in s
or α. Let cok stand for `
o
1 ∨ . . . ∨ `ok. Let sk be the least set that includes s and for every ` ∈ L contains the
clauses
• ¬` ∨ cok
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• ` ∨ `w1 ∨ . . . ∨ `wk−1 ∨ cok
• ` ∨ ¬`w1 ∨ cok, . . . , ` ∨ ¬`wk−1 ∨ cok.
Then
sk |≈ Bk (cok ∧ (
∨
`∈L ¬` ∨ α)) iff
for some t ∈ F , for all names n,
s ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bk−1(
∨
`∈L ¬` ∨ α).
Proof. The proof proceeds in four steps.
Claim 1. sk \ s 6|≈ Bk−1cok.
Proof of Claim 1. Let s′k = sk \ s. The proof is by induction on k. For k = 1, it is immediate that
cok /∈ UP(s′k) and hence s′k 6|≈ Bk−1cok. For the induction step, suppose s′k 6|≈ Bk−1cok; we show
s′k+1 6|≈ Bkcok+1. By Lemma 5, it suffices to show that for all t ∈ F ∪ {fw1 , . . . , fwk , f o1 , . . . , f ok+1}, for
some n, s′k+1 ∪ {t= n} 6|≈ Bk−1cok+1.
• Consider t ∈ {fw1 , . . . , fwk }. Without loss of generality, let t is fwk . Consider a name n such that
t = n is complementary to `wk . Observe that UP(s
′
k ∪ {t = n}) ⊇ UP(s′k+1 ∪ {t = n}) (*). By
induction, s′k 6|≈ Bk−1cok. Since t does not occur in s′k or cok, s′k ∪ {t= n} 6|≈ Bk−1cok+1. By (*),
s′k+1 ∪ {t= n} 6|≈ Bk−1cok+1.
• Consider t ∈ {f o1 , . . . , f ok+1}. Without loss of generality, let t is f ok+1. Consider a name n such that
t= n is complementary to `ok+1. Observe that UP(s
′
k ∪ {t= n}) ⊇ UP(s′k+1 ∪ {t= n}) (*). By
induction, s′k 6|≈ Bk−1cok. Since t does not occur in s′k and does not subsume any literal in cok+1,
s′k ∪ {t= n} 6|≈ Bk−1cok+1. By (*), s′k+1 ∪ {t= n} 6|≈ Bk−1cok+1.
• Consider t ∈ F , and let ` ∈ L be the literal whose left-hand side is t. If ` is an inequality, let
n be its right-hand side. Otherwise, let n be name be such that t = n /∈ L. Then t = n is not
complementary to ¬`, and since all other literals in L have left-hand sides distinct from t, we
have that for every `′ ∈ L, t = n is not complementary to ¬`′. Then UP(s′k+1 ∪ {t = n}) =
UP(s′k+1) ∪ UP({t = n, `w1 ∨ . . . ∨ `wk+1 ∨ cok+1,¬`w1 ∨ cok+1, . . . ,¬`wk+1 ∨ cok+1}). Using this
equivalence, another induction on k shows that s′k+1∪{t=n} 6|≈ Bkcok+1 using the same arguments
as in the above two cases for fwi , f
o
j .
Claim 2. For all t /∈ F ∪ {fw1 , . . . , fwk−1, f o1 , . . . , f ok}, for some n, sk ∪ {t= n} 6|≈ Bk−1cok.
Proof of Claim 2. Let t /∈ F ∪ {fw1 , . . . , fwk−1, f o1 , . . . , f ok}. By assumption, there is some n such that
s∪{t=n} 6|= ∨`∈L(¬)` for all ` ∈ L. Hence and since fwi , f oj do not occur in s, sk ∪{t=n} |≈ Bk−1cok
iff sk \ s |≈ Bk−1cok. By Claim 1, the claim follows.
Claim 3. For all t ∈ F , for all n, sk ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bk−1cok.
Proof of Claim 3. Let t ∈ F and let n be an arbitrary name. Then for all names n1, . . . , nk, cok ∈
UP(sk ∪ {t= n, fw1 = n1, . . . , fwk−1 = nk−1}). Thus sk ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bk−1cok.
Proof of the lemma. For the only-if direction suppose that sk |≈ Bk (cok ∧ (
∨
`∈L ¬`∨α)). Then for some
t, for all n, sk ∪{t=n} |≈ Bk−1(cok ∧ (
∨
`∈L ¬`∨α)). By Claim 2, t ∈ F ∪{fw1 , . . . , fwk−1, f o1 , . . . , f ok}.
Without loss of generality we can assume by Claim 3 and since fwi , f
o
j do not occur in s or α that t ∈ F .
Thus for all n, s ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bk−1(
∨
`∈L ¬` ∨ α).
For the converse direction, let t ∈ F , and suppose that for all n, s∪{t=n} |≈ Bk−1(
∨
`∈L ¬`∨α). Let
n be arbitrary. First suppose that t=n is complementary to ¬` for some ` ∈ L. Then cok ∈ UP(sk∪{t=n}).
Thus and by assumption, sk ∪ {t = n} |≈ Bk−1(cok ∧ (
∨
`∈L ¬` ∨ α)). Now suppose that t = n is not
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complementary to any ¬` with ` ∈ L. There is some ` ∈ L whose left-hand side is t. If ` is of the
form t= n′, then t= n is not complementary to t 6= n′, so n, n′ are distinct and hence t= n subsumes
t 6= n′. Otherwise, if ` is of the form t 6= n′, then t = n is not complementary to t = n′, so n, n′ are
identical and hence t = n subsumes t = n′. Hence ¬` ∈ UP(sk ∪ {t = n}). Thus and by Claim 3,
sk ∪ {t= n} |≈ Bk−1(cok ∧ (
∨
`∈L ¬` ∨ α)). Therefore sk |≈ Bk (cok ∧ (
∨
`∈L ¬` ∨ α)).
The next lemma represents our gadget. Despite its somewhat intimidating interface, it simply plugs
together repeated applications of the previous lemma to completely determine the ordering of splitting
terms from F1, . . . , Fl:
Lemma 7 Let F1, . . . , Fl be non-empty finite sets of function terms, F = F1 ∪ . . . ∪ Fl, and L1, . . . , Ll
be sets of literals such that every term from Fi occurs exactly once in Li. Let Bkα be a formula with
k ≤ l. Let s be a set of clauses such that for all k ∈ [l], for all tl ∈ Fl, . . . , tk+1 ∈ Fk+1, tk /∈ F , for all
nl, . . . , nk+1, nk, s ∪ s′ 6|=
∨
`∈Lk ` where s
′ = {tk = nk, . . . , tl = nl}.
For every set of clauses s′, let s′i and c
o
i be as in Lemma 6 with respect to Fi, Li, α. Let α0 be α and
αi for i > 0 be coi ∧ (
∨
`∈Li ¬` ∨ αi−1).
Then
((s1) . . .)k |≈ Bkαk iff
for some tk ∈ Fk, for all names nk, . . . ,
for some t1 ∈ F1, for all names n1,
s ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tk = nk} |≈
∨
`∈Li,i∈[k] ¬` ∨ α.
Proof. Observe that if s′ 6|= ∨`∈Li(¬)`, then also ((s′1) . . .)j 6|= ∨`∈Li(¬)` (*). We show by induction
on k that for all tl ∈ Fl, . . . , tk+1 and for all nl, . . . , nk+1, (((s∪ {tk+1 = nk+1, . . . , tl = nl})1) . . .)k |≈
Bkαk iff for some t ∈ Fk, for all nk, . . . , for some t ∈ F1, for all n1, s ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tl = nl} |≈
(
∨
`∈Li,i∈[k] ¬` ∨ α). The base case k = 0 follows immediately from Rule 5.
For the induction step, consider k > 0 and arbitrary tl ∈ Fl, . . . , tk+1 ∈ Fk+1 and nl, . . . , nk+1,
and suppose the statement holds for k − 1. Then ((s ∪ {tk+1 = nk+1, . . . , tl = nl})1 . . .)k |≈ Bkαk iff
((s ∪ {tk+1 = nk+1, . . . , tl = nl})1 . . .)k |≈ Bk (cok+1 ∧ (
∨
`∈Lk+1 ¬` ∨ αk)) iff (by Lemma 6, which is
applicable by the assumption that for all tk /∈ F , for some nk, s ∪ {tk = nk, . . . , tl = nl} 6|=
∨
`∈Lk(¬)`
and (*)) for some tk ∈ Fk, for all nk, ((s ∪ {tk+1 = nk+1, . . . , tl = nl})1 . . .)k−1 ∪ {tk = nk} |≈
Bk−1(
∨
`∈Lk ¬` ∨ αk−1) iff for some tk ∈ Fk, for all nk, ((s ∪ {tk = nk, . . . , tl = nl})1 . . .)k−1 |≈
Bk−1(
∨
`∈Lk ¬` ∨ αk−1) iff (by induction) for some tk ∈ Fk, for all nk, . . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all
n1, s ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tk = nk} |≈ (
∨
`∈Li,i∈[k] ¬` ∨ α).
4 Classical Complexity
This section analyzes the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning using classical complexity theory. The
next tractability result follows from the decision procedure from Section 2.3:
Corollary 8 Limited Belief Reasoning with constant k or constant |F| is in PTIME.
Proof. The decision procedure runs in time polynomial with degree k + 3. By Lemmas 1 and 2, k = |F|
suffices.
Next, we consider the case where neither k nor |F| is constant. It comes as no surprise that the
complexity then significantly increases with the number of case splits. Proposition 3 and Lemma 4 showed
that Limited Belief Reasoning is sound and eventually complete with respect to classical reasoning. So
clearly, Limited Belief Reasoning must be co-NP-hard, and eventual completeness may suggest that it is
co-NP-complete as well. However, limiting the number of case splits further adds to the computational
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complexity: whereas in classical reasoning a decision procedure may “simply” split all function terms, a
decision procedure for limited belief needs to make sure it makes use of the available case splits in the best
possible way. This leads to the following result:
Theorem 9 Limited Belief Reasoning with constant |N | is PSPACE-complete. The result also holds when
|N | is input.
Proof. Membership. The decision procedure from Section 2.3 runs in space O(m + k) where m =
|KB|+ |α|, since UP(s) can be represented in space O(|s|) because minimal clauses suffice.
Hardness. We reduce from True Quantified Boolean Formula, which is PSPACE-complete [Arora and
Barak, 2009]. The problem input is a fully quantified Boolean formula Qkxk . . . Q1x1ψ for Qi ∈ {∀,∃}
and a propositional formula ψ. Without loss of generality, we assume that ψ mentions negation only in
front of variables. The question is whether this formula evaluates to TRUE, that is, for all (if Qk = ∀) /
some (if Qk = ∃) assignment(s) of xk, . . . , for all / some assignment(s) of x1, (x1, . . . , xk) satisfies ψ.
A truth assignment of x1, . . . , xj is modeled as a vector M of length k with Mi ∈ {FALSE, TRUE}
to represent the truth assignment of xi. Let N = {>,W} contain two standard names. Let F∀ = {fi |
Qi = ∀}, F∃ = {fi, f ′i | Qi = ∃}, F = F∀ ∪ F∃, where fi, f ′i are pairwise distinct function terms. We
define a mapping ∗ from QBF to limited belief formulas: let x∗i be fi =>, let (¬xi)∗ be fi 6=> if Qi = ∀
and f ′i = > if Qi = ∃, let (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)∗ be (ψ∗1 ∨ ψ∗2), and let (ψ1 ∧ ψ2)∗ be (ψ∗1 ∧ ψ∗2). For Qi = ∀, let
Fi = {fi}, Ni = {n | name n is distinct from W}, and Li = {fi 6=W}; for Qi = ∃, let Fi = {fi, f ′i},
Ni = {>}, and Li = {fi = >, f ′i =>}. Let α be
∨
`∈Li,i∈[k] ¬` ∨ ψ∗. We say a truth assignment M and
a set of clauses s are compatible iff s = {t1 = n1, . . . , tk = nk} where ti ∈ Fi, ni ∈ Ni, and if Qi = ∀,
then Mi = TRUE iff ni = >, and if Qi = ∃, then Mi = TRUE iff ti = fi.
The idea is as follows. Universally quantified xi are naturally translated to literals fi = > so that
the truth values TRUE and FALSE of xi correspond to fi => and fi 6=>, respectively. For existentially
quantified xi, positive occurrences of xi are replaced with fi => and negative ones with f ′i => so that
the truth values TRUE and FALSE of xi correspond to fi => and f ′i =>. The fi or f ′i (if Qi = ∃) then
need to be split in the appropriate order.
In the remainder of the proof we show that φ evaluates to TRUE iff for some tk ∈ Fk, for all ni ∈ Nk,
. . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all n1 ∈ N1, {t1 = n1, . . . , tk = nk} |≈ ψ∗ (*). The right-hand side of (*) holds
iff for some tk ∈ Fk, for all ni, . . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all n1, {t1 = n1, . . . , tk = nk} |≈ α. This in
turn can be reduced in polynomial time to Limited Belief Reasoning by Lemmas 7 and 4, which gives us
PSPACE-hardness.
We now prove by induction on j that for every truth assignment M of xk, . . . , xj+1 and every s
compatible with M , Qjxj . . . Q1x1φ evaluates to TRUE under M iff for some tj ∈ Fj , . . . , for some
t1 ∈ F1, for all n1 ∈ N1, s ∪ {t1 = n1, . . . , tj = nj} |≈ ψ∗. For j = k this is identical to (*).
• For the base case suppose j = 0, let M be a truth assignment of xk, . . . , x1, and let s be compatible
with M . We show that ψ evaluates to TRUE under M iff s |≈ ψ∗ by subinduction on ψ.
For the base case consider a literal. A positive literal xi evaluates to TRUE under M iff Mi = TRUE
iff fi = > ∈ s iff s |≈ fi = > iff s |≈ x∗i . A negative literal ¬xi with Qi = ∀ evaluates to TRUE
under M iff Mi = FALSE iff fi = n ∈ s for some n /∈ {>,W} iff fi 6=> ∈ UP(s) iff s |≈ fi 6=>
iff s |≈ (¬xi)∗. A negative literal ¬xi with Qi = ∃ evaluates to TRUE under M iff Mi = FALSE iff
f ′i => ∈ s iff s |≈ f ′i => iff s |≈ (¬xi)∗.
The subinduction steps are trivial.
• For the induction step suppose that the statement holds for j, and let M be a truth assignment
of xk, . . . , xj and s be compatible with M . We write M · v for the extension of M with value
v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE} for xj+1.
First consider Qi = ∀. Then Qj+1xj+1 . . . Q1x1ψ evaluates to TRUE under M iff for every v ∈
{FALSE, TRUE}, Qjxj . . . Q1x1ψ evaluates to TRUE under M · v iff (by induction) for every v ∈
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{FALSE, TRUE}, for every sv ⊇ s that is compatible with M · v, for some tj ∈ Fj , for all nj ∈ Nj ,
. . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all n1 ∈ N1, sv |≈ ψ∗ iff for some tj+1 ∈ Fj+1, for all nj+1 ∈ Nj+1,
. . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all n1 ∈ N1, s |≈ ψ∗.
Now consider Qi = ∃. Then Qj+1xj+1 . . . Q1x1ψ evaluates to TRUE under M iff for some v ∈
{FALSE, TRUE}, Qjxj . . . Q1x1ψ evaluates to TRUE under M · v iff (by induction) for some v ∈
{FALSE, TRUE}, for the unique sv ⊇ s that is compatible with M · v, for some tj ∈ Fj , for all
nj ∈ Nj , . . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all n1 ∈ N1, sv |≈ ψ∗ iff for some tj+1 ∈ Fj+1, for all
nj+1 ∈ Nj+1, . . . , for some t1 ∈ F1, for all n1 ∈ N1, s |≈ ψ∗.
It is noteworthy that this reduction only uses two standard names. With a more involved reduction,
even a single name suffices. Thus even the propositional case (where an atomic proposition p is simulated
by p=>) is PSPACE-complete.
5 Parameterized Complexity
The gap between tractability and PSPACE-completeness from the previous section calls for a more refined
analysis. In this section we use parameterized complexity theory to investigate how the parameters k, |F|,
and/or |N | affect the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning.
While many unparameterized problems can be classified with the classical classes PTIME, NP, or
PSPACE, parameterized versions of these problems fall into a variety of complexity classes [Flum and
Grohe, 2006]. The role of PTIME in parameterized complexity is taken on by FPT, which includes
problems parameterized by k that are solvable in f(k) · p(n), where f is a computable function and p
a polynomial. Other important parameterized classes come from the W- and A-hierarchies: the classes
W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ . . . ⊆ W[SAT] ⊆ W[P] include parameterized versions of different natural NP-complete
problems; similarly, the classes A[1] ⊆ A[2] ⊆ . . . ⊆ AW[SAT] ⊆ AW[P] can be seen as a parameterized
version of the polynomial hierarchy. Figure 1 displays the classes that are relevant for this paper.
Membership in classes of the W- and A-hierarchies can be shown using machines that restrict the
number of nondeterministic steps [Chen et al., 2005]. An NRAM is a random access machine with an
additional nondeterministic EXISTS instruction, which guesses a natural number less than or equal to
a certain register and stores the number in that register. A problem is in W[P] iff it is decidable by an
NRAM in f(k) ·p(n) steps, at most g(k) of them being nondeterministic, using at most the first f(k) ·p(n)
registers and only numbers ≤ f(k) · p(n). A problem is in AW[P] iff it is decidable by an ARAM with the
same constraints, where an ARAM is an NRAM with an additional nondeterministic FORALL instruction,
the dual to EXISTS.
Hardness in parameterized complexity is shown by way of fpt-reductions, which are reductions
computable in time f(k) ·p(n) and such that k′ ≤ g(k), where k and k′ are the parameters of the problems
reduced from and reduced to, respectively, n is the input size, f and g are computable functions, and p is a
polynomial.
Before we start our analysis, we introduce a problem called Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability.
A circuit is a directed acyclic graph (V,E) whose vertices are partitioned into input-nodes X of in-degree
0, not-nodes of in-degree 1, and- and or-nodes of in-degree > 0, and a distinguished output-node v0 of
out-degree 0. An assignment S ⊆ X sets inputs S to TRUE and the other ones to FALSE and propagates the
values to the output node, whose value then determines whether or not S satisfies the circuit. A monotone
circuit contains no not-nodes.
Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability
Instance: A monotone circuit C with input-nodes partitioned into sets X1, . . . , Xl.
Parameter: k1 + . . .+ kl
Problem: Decide whether for all S1 ⊆ X1 with |S1| = k1, for some S2 ⊆ X2 with
|S2| = k2, . . . , the assignment S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sl satisfies C.
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The following lemma states AW[P]-completeness for the problem, which has been claimed elsewhere
before without explicit proof [Abrahamson et al., 1995].
Lemma 10 Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability is AW[P]-complete.
Proof. It is sufficient to reduce from Quantified Circuit Satisfiability, which is AW[P]-complete [Flum and
Grohe, 2006]. Consider an instance with circuit C = (V,E) and inputs X1, . . . , Xl. By De Morgan’s laws
we can assume the not-nodes are right above the inputs.
Consider a not-node w ∈ V with incoming edge {x,w} ∈ E. By assumption, x ∈ Xi for some i ∈ [l].
Observe that for every assignment Si of Xi, w is FALSE iff x /∈ Si iff ki variables in Xi \ {x} are set to
TRUE iff ≥ ki variables in Xi \ {x} are set to TRUE. So it suffices to replace w with the following circuit
with inputs Xi.
Let Xi \ {x} = {x1, . . . , xm}. For every 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ m and t ∈ [ki], we introduce an or-node
vi1,i2,t with the meaning that at least t inputs among xi1 , . . . , xi2 are TRUE, and for every pair of these
or-nodes an and-node that takes the pair as inputs. The inputs of vi1,i2,t for i2 − i1 > t are the and-nodes
of the pairs vi1,i′,t′ and vi′+1,i2,t−t′ such that i1 ≤ i′ < i2 and t′ ∈ [t], thus representing that t among
xi1 , . . . , xi2 are set to TRUE if for some i
′ and t′, t′ of xi1 , . . . , xi′ and t
′ − t of xi′+1, . . . , xi2 are TRUE.
Then we take v1,m,ki as the output of the desired subcircuit that replaces w.
The subcircuit is monotone and can be determined time O(k2i · m4). We iterate the procedure to
eliminate all negations and thus obtain an fpt-reduction to a monotone circuit.
With this lemma we can establish the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning parameterized by the
belief level:
Theorem 11 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameter k is AW[P]-complete.
Proof. Membership. We implement the decision procedure from Section 2.3 using an ARAM. Model
checking at belief level 0 can clearly be done on a RAM in time p(m) using at most p(m) registers and
numbers ≤ p(m), where p is a polynomial and m = |KB|+ |α|. At belief level k > 0, we select one of
the function terms from F with an EXISTS instruction, and the corresponding name from N ∪ {nˆ} using
a FORALL instruction. This amounts to 2 · k nondeterministic steps and a total runtime 2 · k · p(m), and
since |F| ≤ m and |N | ≤ m, the problem is in AW[P].
Hardness. We reduce from Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability, which is AW[P]-complete by
Lemma 10. Let C=(V,E) be a monotone circuit with inputs X1, . . . , Xl. We say Xi or x ∈ Xi is
universal (existential) iff i is odd (even).
Let F = {fv | v ∈ V } ∪ {fi,j | Xi universal, j ∈ [ki]} ∪ {fx,j | x ∈ Xi existential, j ∈ [ki]} be
function terms. Let N = {>,W} ∪ {nx | x ∈ Xi universal} be standard names.
The idea is as follows. A literal fv = > represents that node v is TRUE. The truth assignment of
existential Xi is selected by splitting some ki of {fx,j | x ∈ Xi, j ∈ [ki]} and skipping all values but >.
The truth assignment of universal Xi is selected by splitting fi,1, . . . , fi,ki one after another, whose value
denotes which variable should be set to TRUE: if the value is nx, it is x. The truth assignment of existential
Xi is selected by splitting one of {fx,1 | x ∈ Xi}, . . . , one of {fx,ki | x ∈ Xi}, whose value is set to >,
which then triggers the corresponding x to be set to TRUE.
For universal Xi and j ∈ [ki], let Fi,j = {fi,j}, Ni,j = {nx | x ∈ Xi}, and Li,j = {fi,j 6=W}. For
universal Xi, let si be the least set that contains fi,j 6= nx ∨ fx = > for all j ∈ [ki] and x ∈ Xi, and∨
x∈Xi fi,j = nx ∨ fi,j =W for all j ∈ [ki]. For existential Xi and j ∈ [ki], let Fi,j = {fx,j | x ∈ Xi},
Ni,j = {>}, and Li,j = {fx,j = > | x ∈ Xi}. For existential Xi, let si be the least set that contains
fx,j 6=> ∨ fx => for all j ∈ [ki] and x ∈ Xi. Let s be the least set such that s ⊇ si for all i ∈ [l], and
that contains
∨
w∈W fw 6=> ∨ fv => for every and-node v and its inputs W = {w | (w, v) ∈ E}, and
fw 6=> ∨ fv => for all or-nodes v and all inputs w with (w, v) ∈ E.
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In the remainder of the proof we show that for all S1 ⊆ X1 with |S1| ≤ k1, for some S2 ⊆ X2 with
|S2| ≤ k2, . . . , the truth assignment S1∪. . .∪Sl satisfiesC iff for some t1,1 ∈ F1,1, for all n1,1 ∈ N1,1, . . . ,
for some t1,k1 ∈ F1,k1 , for all n1,k1 ∈ N1,k1 , . . . , for some tl,1 ∈ Fl,1, for all nl,1 ∈ Nl,1, . . . , for some
tl,kl ∈ Fl,kl , for all nl,kl ∈ Nl,kl , s∪ {t1,1 = n1,1, . . . , t1,k1 = n1,k1 , . . . , tl,1 = nl,1, . . . , tl,kl = nl,kl} |≈
fv0 = > (*). The left-hand side of (*) is equivalent to the Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability
problem due to the circuit’s monotonicity. The right-hand side of (*) holds iff for some t1,1 ∈ F1,1, for
all n1,1, . . . , for some t1,k1 ∈ F1,k1 , for all n1,k1 , . . . , for some tl,1 ∈ Fl,1, for all nl,1, . . . , for some
tl,kl ∈ Fl,kl , for all nl,kl , s |≈
∨
`∈Li,j ,i∈[l],[j]∈[ki] ¬` ∨ fv0 => since s contains clauses that restrict the
domain of fi,j for universal Xi to {nx | x ∈ Xi} ∪ {W}. This in turn fpt-reduces to Limited Belief
Reasoning by Lemma 7, which is applicable here since the Fi,j are mutually disjoint, and Lemma 4, which
gives us AW[P]-hardness.
We first define when a truth assignment Si ⊆ Xi and a set of clauses s′ are compatible: if Xi is
universal, then Si, s′ are compatible iff |Si| = |s′| and for every x ∈ Si, for some j ∈ [ki], fi,j = nx ∈ s′;
if Xi is existential, then Si, s′ are compatible iff |Si| = |s′| and for every x ∈ Si, for some j ∈ [ki],
fx,j = > ∈ s′. We now prove by induction on j ≤ l that for a given truth assignment S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sj
the following statement: for all (if j + 1 is odd) / some (otherwise) Sj+1 ⊆ Xj+1 with |Sj+1| ≤ kj+1,
for some / all Sj+2 ⊆ Xj+2 with |Sj+2| ≤ kj+2, . . . , S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sl satisfies C iff for all compatible
s′1, . . . , s
′
j , for some tj+1,1 ∈ Fj+1,1, for all nj+1,1 ∈ Nj+1,1, . . . , for some tj+1,kj+1 ∈ Fj+1,kj+1 , for all
nj+1,kj+1 ∈ Nj+1,kj+1 , . . . , tl,1 ∈ Fl,1, for all nl,1 ∈ Nl,1, . . . , for some tl,kl ∈ Fl,kl , for all nl,kl ∈ Nl,kl ,
s∪ s′1 ∪ . . .∪ s′j ∪{t1,1=n1,1, . . . , t1,k1 =n1,k1 , . . . , tl,1=nl,1, . . . , tl,kl =nl,kl} |≈ fv0 =>. For j = 0
this is identical to (*).
• For the base case j = l we show by subinduction on the depth of C that v ∈ V is satisfied iff
fx = > ∈ UP(s ∪ s′1 ∪ . . . ∪ s′j). The base case holds since Si and s′i are compatible and by
construction of s. The subinduction step follows immediately by construction of s.
• For the induction step suppose the claim holds for j + 1.
First suppose j + 1 is odd. Then for all Sj+1 ⊆ Xj+1 with |Sj+1| ≤ kj+1, for some Sj+2 ⊆ Xj+2
with |Sj+2| ≤ kj+2, . . . , S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sl satisfies C iff (by induction) for all Sj+1 ⊆ Xj+1 with
|Sj+1| ≤ kj+1, for all compatible s′1, . . . , s′j+1, some tj+2,1 ∈ Fj+2,1, for all nj+2,1 ∈ Nj+2,1,
. . . , for some tj+2,kj+2 ∈ Fj+2,k2 , for all nj+2,k2 ∈ Nj+1,kj+2 , . . . , tl,1 ∈ Fl,1, for all nl,1 ∈ Nl,1,
. . . , for some tl,kl ∈ Fl,kl , for all nl,kl ∈ Nl,kl , s ∪ s′1 ∪ . . . ∪ s′j ∪ {t1,1 = n1,1, . . . , t1,k1 =
n1,k1 , . . . , tl,1 = nl,1, . . . , tl,kl = nl,kl} |≈ fv0 = > iff for all compatible s′1, . . . , s′j , for some
tj+1,1 ∈ Fj+1,1, for all nj+1,1 ∈ Nj+1,1, . . . , for some tj+2,kj+2 ∈ Fj+2,k2 , for all nj+2,k2 ∈
Nj+1,kj+2 , . . . , tl,1 ∈ Fl,1, for all nl,1 ∈ Nl,1, . . . , for some tl,kl ∈ Fl,kl , for all nl,kl ∈ Nl,kl ,
s ∪ s′1 ∪ . . . ∪ s′j ∪ {t1,1 = n1,1, . . . , t1,k1 = n1,k1 , . . . , tl,1 = nl,1, . . . , tl,kl = nl,kl} |≈ fv0 =>.
The case for even j + 1 is analogous.
Membership in AW[P] is quite natural due to the alternation of existential and universal quantifications
of case splits in Lemma 5. When the number of standard names |N | becomes a parameter as well, this
gives us leverage to replace the nondeterministic FORALL steps that select the standard names with a
simple loops. It is therefore not surprising that Limited Belief Reasoning parameterized by k and |N | is in
W[P], the hardest NP-analogue of the W-hierarchy. The following result shows that the problem is in fact
W[P]-complete:
Proposition 12 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameters k and |N | is W[P]-hard. The result also holds
when |N | is constant.
Proof. Membership. We build an NRAM. For k = 0, it behaves like the ARAM in Theorem 11. For
k > 0, we select a function term from F with EXISTS and loop over all names inN ∪{nˆ}. This amounts
to (|N |+ k)k nondeterministic steps and total runtime (|N |+ k)k · p(m), so the problem is in W[P].
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Hardness. We reduce from Weighted Monotone Circuit Satisfiability, which is W[P]-complete [Abraham-
son et al., 1995]. Weighted Circuit Satisfiability corresponds to Quantified Weighted Circuit Satisfiability
with only existentially quantified variables, and the reduction is identical to one from Theorem 11 for a
single block of existential variables. The reduction uses only a single name >.
Next we consider the case where |F| becomes a parameter. The below theorem specifies co-W[P]-
completeness:
Theorem 13 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameters k and |F| is co-W[P]-complete. The result also
holds when k is input.
Proof. Membership. We show that the co-problem is in W[P] using an NRAM that finds a falsifying
assignment of names for all split terms. As in Theorem 11, the case k = 0 is straightforward. For k > 0
we loop over all function terms in F and for each we select a standard name from N ∪ {nˆ} with EXISTS.
This amounts to |F|k nondeterministic steps, which by Lemma 2 can be generalized to |F||F|. The total
runtime is hence |F||F| · p(m), so the problem is in co-W[P].
Hardness. We reduce from the complement of Weighted Anti-Monotone Circuit Satisfiability, which is
W[P]-complete [Flum and Grohe, 2006]. A circuit is anti-monotone when all inputs have out-degree 1 and
feed into a not-node and there are no other not-nodes except those on top of some input. Let C = (V,E)
be an anti-monotone circuit with inputs X . For every x ∈ X we denote the associated not-node by vx.
Let F = {fi | i ∈ [k]} ∪ {f} be function terms. Let N = {nv | v ∈ V \ X} ∪ {W} be standard
names.
The idea is to represent that a node v is set to FALSE by f 6= nv. The truth assignment is selected
by splitting f1, . . . , fk. Truth of an input x is represented by fi = nvx for some i ∈ [k], which triggers
f 6= nnx ; these values are propagated to the output node, so that f 6= nv0 indicates that the circuit is
falsified.
For every i ∈ [k], let Li = {fi 6=W} and let si be the least set that contains fi 6= nvx ∨ f 6= nvx for
every x ∈ X , and ∨x∈X fi = nvx ∨ fi =W. Let s be the least set such that s ⊇ si for all i ∈ [k], and
fi 6= nvx ∨ fj 6= nvx for every i, j ∈ [k] with i 6= j and x ∈ X , and
∨
w∈W f = nw ∨ f 6= nv for every
or-node v and its inputs W = {w | (w, v) ∈ E}, and f = nw ∨ f 6= nv for all and-nodes v and all inputs
w with (w, v) ∈ E.
Let N = {nvx | x ∈ X}. In the remainder of the proof we show that every truth assignment S ⊆ X
with |S| = k falsifies C iff for all n1, . . . , nk ∈ N , s ∪ {f1 = n1, . . . , fk = nk} |≈ f 6= nv0 (*). The
right-hand side of (*) holds iff for all n1, . . . , nk, s∪{f1=n1, . . . , fk=nk} |≈
∨
`∈Li,i∈[k] ¬`∨ f 6=nv0
since s contains clauses that restrict the domain of fi to N ∪ {W}. This in turn fpt-reduces to Limited
Belief Reasoning by Lemmas 7 and 4, which gives us co-W[P]-hardness.
We first define that a truth assignment S ⊆ X and a set of clauses s′ are compatible iff |S| = |s′| and
for every x ∈ S, for some i ∈ [k], fi = nvx ∈ s′. We now prove (*).
For the only-if direction suppose that every S ⊆ X falsifies C and consider some n1, . . . , nk ∈ N . Let
s′ = {f1 = n1, . . . , fk = nk}. If for some i 6= j, ni = nj , then by construction, s ∪ s′ |≈ f 6= nv0 . Hence
x ∈ S iff for some i, fi=nvx ∈ s′. Thus and by construction of s, S falsifies vx iff f 6= nvx ∈ UP(s∪ s′).
By induction on the depth of C, f 6= nv0 .
For the if direction suppose that for all n1, . . . , nk ∈ N , s ∪ {f1 = n1, . . . , fk = nk} |≈ f 6= nv0
and consider some S ⊆ X . Choose n1, . . . , nk such that x ∈ S iff for some i, fi = nvx ∈ s′. Then by
construction of s, S falsifies vx iff f 6= nvx ∈ UP(s ∪ s′). By induction on the depth of C, S falsifies vx
iff f 6= nvx ∈ UP(s ∪ s′).
Finally, the only remaining case is when Limited Belief Reasoning is parameterized by both |F| and
|N |:
Proposition 14 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameters |F| and |N | is in FPT. The result also holds
when |N | is constant.
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Proof. The decision procedure for belief level k corresponds to a tree of height 2 · k with alternating
branching factors |F| and |N |+k. The runtime of the decision procedure is hence (|F| ·(|N |+k))k ·p(m)
for some polynomial p and m = |KB| + |α|. By Lemma 2, this generalizes to (|F| · (|N | + |F|))|F| ·
p(m).
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning. While tractable for constant belief levels,
the complexity jumps to PSPACE-complete in the general case. Using parameterized complexity theory,
we showed how parameterized versions of the problem populate the space between these two extremes.
We believe our findings are relevant to the future development of the theory of limited belief. In
particular, the insight that the limited belief level can actually increase the computational cost should be
considered in future versions.
In light of PSPACE-completeness, one might implement a reasoning system using an off-the-shelf
QBF-solver. Also, limited belief and the available reasoning system [Schwering, 2017] may be suitable as
a modeling language for other problems in PSPACE.
So far, we have only considered Limited Belief Reasoning without first-order quantification; lifting this
restriction would be a natural next step. Moreover, additional parameters could be studied, for example,
parameters exploiting the structure of the knowledge base and the query, like backdoors [Gaspers and
Szeider, 2012].
Another interesting question is whether our findings carry over to other approaches to resource-bounded
reasoning, such as [D’Agostino, 2015], which uses a similar splitting technique.
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